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REFLECTIONS ON THE FREEDOM 
OF SCIENCE 
of us have had intimate experience of learning and 
failing to  learn, and so we may think of knowledge as a A"" 
private possession or a personal accomplishment. Indeed, it 
is that; but it also has a larger context. Knowledge is a cul- 
tural phenomenon. Science, the deliberate pursuit of knowl- 
edge, is an institution characteristic of Western Civilization. 
To say i t  is an institution is t o  say that  i t  consists in an or- 
ganization of individual activities about urgently felt needs. 
In  so far as i t  depends on perception and springs from in- 
stinctive inquisitiveness and the effort toward self-preserva- 
tion, knowledge is continuous in an evolutionary sense with 
animal irritability or feeling. But science could not begin un- 
til the instinctive had gathered to  itself the meanings and 
controls comprised under the broad notion of civilization. 
In  fact, it seems to  have required the special complex of cir- 
cumstances which produced the ancient Greek civilization, 
since in no other, apart from Greek example and influence, 
have cognitive activities been able t o  disentangle themseIves 
from the other uses of the mind and embark upon a compara- 
tively independent career of their own. 
The growth of this specialty doubtIess exhibits similarities 
to  the growth of all the other specialties which mark the ex- 
istence of civilization. Specialization is one of the decisive 
tricks by which human groups have contrived to  increase 
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their total efficiency. The Jack-of-all-trades proverbially ex- 
cels at none; he lacks concentration. Yet if his energies are 
not to  be dispersed in a round of daily tasks, his necessary 
wants must be cared for by others. Only in this fashion is i t  
possibIe for him to devote himself with singleness of purpose 
to  the cultivation of some particular skill. An exchange of 
services is thus required as a necessary condition of a division 
of function. The development of specialties cannot, there- 
fore, be the product of merely individual initiative, however 
important that also is, for it marks a growing dependence of 
men upon each other and creates an intensified need for or- 
ganizing diverse functions into a common life. This is a fur- 
ther reason why specialization has been an overwhelmingly 
successful trick: in addition t o  increasing the sum of indi- 
vidual abilities, it encourages new achievements in the diffi- 
cult art of coGperation. 
If some particular interest, say curiosity, is t o  separate it- 
self from the common matrix of life, so that it acquires an in- 
dependent status, generating its own institutions and inner 
discipline, then it must perform services which the com- 
munity (or an effective segment of it) considers commensurate 
with its implicit claim upon the general resources, spiritual as 
well as material. And so the conception of their true welfare, 
which members of a community have, determines what they 
particularly concentrate upon. The degree of development: 
and relative authority of their major institutions outline their 
dominant valuations. If an institution ceases to  satisfy a per- 
sistent interest, or if the interest which it  promotes vanishes, 
or if in time the orientation of the whole of life undergoes a 
transformation, then the institution will become decadent or 
be crowded out by more active concerns. I n  the long run, 
each specialty must maintain itself by its contribution to the 
organization of all specialties in the unity of a common life. 
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Though these remarks seem obvious, the truth to  which 
they allude is not always easy t o  recall. To  the specialist the 
particular object of his interest almost inevitably appears 
bigger than life. He suffers a strong temptation to  make 
everything a branch of his own specialty, as 6. Lowes 
Dickinson once put it. His very concentration makes him 
jealous of interference; quite properly, he wants to  get ahead 
with his work. He tends to  think of his work as a thing apart, 
with an unqualified right to  develop according to  the inner ne- 
cessitiesof its nature. When this belief becomes articulate, then 
one hears the familiar doctrines: art for art's sake, knowledge 
for its own sake, virtue is its own reward, business is business. 
Unqualified freedom amounts t o  the enjoyment of rights 
without corresponding duties; i t  implies a claim upon the 
protection of law without itself being under legal control. 
Sometimes we think ourselves free in this unrestricted way, if 
we are aware of being left alone but are not equally aware of 
the positive tolerance of those who leave us alone. It takes a 
threat of interference to  make us aware of it. Whereas for- 
merly advanced physical research has been tolerated with the 
mixed astonishment and contempt which most people reserve 
for harmless and disinterested learning, it has now turned 
into a political and military issue. Over all there hovers a 
sense of urgency, which shows how well we have learned that, 
instruments of force being as recondite and intricate as they 
now are, the frail balance of international power may at  any 
moment be upset by a discovery in the laboratory. With this 
new ge~zeral recognition of the value which a vigorous scien- 
tific establishment has for the nation, science is brought 
within the orbit of national purpose. There is, of course, 
nothing new in requiring the man of science to  do his duty as 
a citizen and place his special abilities, if need be, a t  the serv- 
ice of his country in time of war, But never before have they 
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been required in peace time, a t  the level of basic research, and 
on so extensive a scale. Never before have abstruse develop- 
ments a t  the advancing front of knowledge possessed such 
immediate and far-reaching practical import. T h e  customary 
balance of controls in modern science may be a t  the point of 
being upset, with the  interest in utility winning the upper 
hand a t  last over the  love of truth. This does not mean tha t  
the  individual chemist or physicist or biologist has lost in- 
terest in his subject. It does mean tha t  supreme control of re- 
search may pass into the hands of men who are enormously 
more impressed by the power, ultimately the military power, 
yielded by science than by the  truth which i t  reveals. If  this 
should happen, science will become a tool of powerful inter- 
ests, just as medievaI philosophy, including natural philoso- 
phy, was the handmaiden of religious conformity. 
Perhaps this analogy is not as fanciful as i t  may appear a t  
first sight. It would be close indeed if, as Reinhold Niebuhr 
holds, certain economic and political beliefs have assumed the 
force of passionately held religious dogmas, a kind of idolatry 
of nation or class. Whether or not, in this suggestion, excita- 
bility outruns sober judgment, the  period of laissez faire in 
scientific research, no less than in economic and political af- 
fairs, appears t o  be ending, and with i t  the  illusion of uncon- 
ditional independence. We must think more concretely, 
therefore, about the  nature of science. 
Where, i t  may be asked, is the philosophical problem here? 
Practical and political problems there may be in great plenty; 
but political crises cannot alter the logical character of 
knowledge, respecting which alone scientific freedom has 
meaning. This is the freedom t o  affirm as true only proposi- 
tions which satisfy the most exacting demands of critical in- 
telligence. Even logicians and epistemologists, as disputatious 
as they are, are compelled t o  agree regarding these demands, 
68 Public Lectures 
for none will deny that  factual knowledge must conform to 
the joint criteria of precise fidelity to deliberate observation 
and systematic theoretical consistency. Other considerations 
are irrelevant. Neither piety nor righteousness, nor expedi- 
ency, nor good taste and good manners, neither private 
predilection nor public approval, have evidential force. In 
virtue of the inner necessity of conforming to  its own criteria, 
science must possess autonomy; its claim to freedom of self- 
determination is self-justifying. 
There is no reason to  gainsay any of this. It shouId be rec- 
ognized, however, that  the notion of pure science is an ab- 
straction-a selective emphasis, valuable for certain pur- 
poses, of a real and vital aspect of concrete fact. Still, it is an 
abstraction, and it omits no less significant aspects which are 
crucial in the present context. There is an analogy in morals. 
Though autonomy of the will may be the necessary condition, 
as Kant held, for moral freedom, yet for men to  be free re- 
quires a good deal more than this in the way of legal order in 
the political community. Similarly, the autonomy of the in- 
tellect is undoubtedly a necessary condition of any knowledge 
whatsoever, but this alone cannot guarantee freedom for the 
scientist any more than it  can confer on him control of the 
whole social institution which is modern science. The po- 
sition of science in a culture, the kind of "freedom" it en- 
joys-this is determined by the ends towards which the 
people as a whole direct their activities, by the prevailing 
opinion regarding the role of science in life, by the impersonal 
pressure of events, and only in part by its own logical pur- 
poses and native tendency. 
Some light may be thrown on these very general remarks 
by a study of the contrast between the two great periods of 
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scientific activity. To  speak of the contrast, as if it were a 
rather simple and obvious thing, is, of course, misIeading. 
But sufficient preliminary accuracy may be achieved in terms 
of a characteristic opposition between Platonism and certain 
phases of modern instrumentalism. For Plato, knowledge 
was a 'noble and commanding thing,' the only true qualifica- 
tion for political authority, the condition on which in the last 
resort the welfare of all depends. For instrumentalism, on the 
other hand, which has been elaborated during the last half 
century in the name of science and democracy, knowledge is 
the instrument, though not quite the "tool," of practice. 
Plato was working within a mature intellectual tradition 
when he discussed the nature and cultural significance of 
science. He was also under the influence of Socrates's ethical 
ideas. The combination of these factors determined his eval- 
uation of the role of exact knowledge in civilization. From his 
great master, whose discourses he had listened to  during im- 
pressionable years, Plato gained the ineradicable conviction 
that "the unexamined life is not worth living"; that i t  is im- 
possible to  live and act well unless spiritual ignorance has 
been overcome by rational discipline culminating in a knowl- 
edge of the good. Excellence in the management of human 
affairs of any kind, whether public or private, requires wis- 
dom, a reasoned appreciation of well-being. But PIato also 
realized that such wisdom, if it can be directly cultivated at  
all, can be so only after a lengthy and arduous preliminary 
education of moral character, taste, and intellect. That is to  
say, it is possible only for members of a high civilization, 
whose natural love of fair things and fair deeds has grown 
deep and true under the solicitation of their material and so- 
cial environment. The final achievement, however, involves 
a cultivated intellect, a mind trained to  see the genera1 
principle in the particular case, and relentless in exposing 
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the pretence of merely casual emotion and merely plausible 
opinion. Consequently, when he outlined the kind of educa- 
tion which might help produce men of wisdom, Plato pro- 
posed as a preparation for the final effort a t  critical evalua- 
tion first a thorough inculcation of good habits and good taste 
and then advanced instruction in all the exact sciences, math- 
ematical and physical. The chief value of the study of what 
we should call science was thus found in the cultivation of 
objective and logical habits of mind, which are indispensable 
t o  the growth of that  wisdom which is the salvation of 
families and states. 
It may seem odd that a view which makes virtue depend on 
the exercise of reason should be assailed on the ground that  
i t  separates theory and practice. But the instrumentalist does 
attack it  on this ground, because he conceives practice to 
consist primarily in the effort t o  control the natural processes 
which provide the framework for individual and socia1 life. 
Theory has the function of rendering this control more reli- 
able. It is thus inseparable from the techniques of manipu- 
lating and changing the course of nature. Greek philosophy, 
according to  this view, did not stoop to  this. "It is not t o  be 
inferred," Dewey explained in The Quest for Certainty, "that 
Greek philosophy separated activity from knowing. It con- 
nected them. But it distinguished activity from action-that 
is, from making and doing." (P. 17) A moment later he is 
generalizing about "the chief tradition." "Ac- 
cording to  it," he says, "the realms of knowledge and of 
practical action have no inherent connection with each 
other." (P. 19) Activity, supremely exemplified in critical 
reflection and contemplation of the highest and most divine 
things, is thus conceived to  be akin to aesthetic enjoyment 
rather than to  practice; but action-making and doing- 
takes our ideals down into the bruising turbulence of ex- 
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istencewhere false steps are quickly repaid with hard knocks. 
An image of the good does not answer to  our needs, nor an 
understanding of the general character of nature and our 
place in it. We must above all know exactly how to achieve 
what we aim at; if we aim at  the wrong thing, experience will 
soon enlighten us. Icnowledge, therefore, has value primarily 
as the power t o  get our way by controlling natural inter- 
actions of things, of men, and of social groups. The contem- 
plative concentration of the mind in a final appreciation of 
the highest truth, which Aristotle no less than Plato hailed as 
reason's supreme achievement, may be agreeable, the crown 
of leisure, but it is not knowledge, except as it has been put 
to  the test of practice. Apart from making and doing, theory 
is a beguiling amusement, diverting us from the urgencies of 
action. 
Whatever the merits of this interpretation, it fails to bring 
out the actual accomplishment of the Greeks. For they per- 
formed the infinitely difficult and indispensable work of 
genius. They took the first unimaginable step toward that  
superb specialization of knowledge which forms the back- 
ground and condition of the instrumentalist criticism. Early 
in the sixth century B.C., according to  the learned tradition, 
Thales, a citizen of the Ionian city of Miletus, began the pur- 
suit of knowledge for the sake of enlightenment. In effect, he 
discovered that cognition was capable of independent de- 
velopment, extricated from its habitual entanglement in 
mythological symbolism and ritual practice. He discovered 
the art of speculation, of looking on disinterestedly, of the- 
orizing abstractly. The concept of nature emerged as the ob- 
jective counterpart of this independence of cognitive function; 
the love of truth appeared as a new spiritual motive. 
The next essential step was t o  distinguish this activity 
from everything which might distract it, and find out what 
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theory could do by the simple device of trying it out-not 
that  this sophisticated program could be consciously followed 
in an age of speculative innocence. Rather, it was as if an in- 
toxicating promise had been felt in the new ar t  of theorizing, 
which was practiced with perhaps more enthusiasm than 
discernment. Everything was fitted into a theory, without 
much fuss, in the beginning, about the  kind of fit. I n  this way, 
the  Greek intellectual quickly learned t o  recognize and con- 
trast opposed theories, t o  array evidence, t o  support opinions 
with consecutive arguments, and to  detect inconsistencies. 
He  learned-and this was the essence of his achievement-to 
disengage his perceptions and beliefs from their natural, 
primitive immersion in action, and t o  raise them to  the sym- 
bolic level, where they could be discussed in their general sig- 
nificance rather than acted upon in the  obdurate particularity 
of their existence. H e  learned, that  is t o  say, t o  analyse, t o  
generalize, and then t o  criticise abstractions; he learned the  
distinction between reasons and inducements, and that  be- 
tween invalid and valid argument, although the theory of ar- 
gument had to  await Aristotle. T h e  result, within little more 
than two centuries, was the beginnings of scientific arithme- 
tic, geometry, harmonics, astronomy, the empirical medicine 
of the  Hippocratic tradition, a somewhat halting physics and 
bioIogy, and objective studies of cultural phenomena such as 
language, custom, law, history, and perennially illuminating 
interpretations of moral and political principles. 
All this was made possible by turning away from "making 
and doing." Geometry and astronomy, the  two sciences in 
which the Greeks excelled, both grew out of lore borrowed 
from foreign cultures for which the Greeks had practical 
rather than theoretical interest. Geometry, as a technique of 
land measurement, had plain advantages in agriculturaI 
Egypt, with its frequent floods and efficient system of taxa- 
Reflections on the Freedom of Science 73 
tion. The  Greeks borrowed everything they could, and, gen- 
eralizing, seeking reasons, systematizing, made a science of it. 
Similarly, they created scientific astronomy, instead of rest- 
ing content with the lore which older civilizations had found 
sufficient for agricultural, ceremonial, and astrological pur- 
poses. Thales is said to  have predicted an eclipse, doubtless 
relying on borrowed techniques. About two centuries later, 
Eudoxus, Plato's younger contemporary, was offering a geo- 
metrical explanation of the apparent motions of the  heavenly 
bodies in terms of supposed true motions of concentric 
spheres. This is exactly the sort of development which Plato 
sponsored in his famous advice t o  astronomers, that  they deal 
with problems and leave the heavens alone. (Repz~bl ic  VII, 
530B) What  was needed was not more data but better theory. 
The rational study of stellar motions was hence proclaimed, 
like the rest of mathematics, an essential ingredient of higher 
education. 
Plato was fully aware of the  practical utility of geometry, 
arithmetic, and astronomy in agriculture, commerce, and 
war; but he correctly appraised their then possible applica- 
tions as scientifically trivial, however indispensable t o  effi- 
ciency. Besides, he had learned from Socrates that  the chief 
problem is not how t o  make things but how t o  be men. T o  him 
the  true use of science could only be the  higher one, which ob- 
tained institutional embodiment in the Academy, to  foster 
intellectual maturity and cuItivate that  superb disinterested- 
ness which is a propaedeutic t o  moral generosity and political 
wisdom. 
I n  its first appearance the  scientific spirit tried t o  fly. It 
had t o  rise above the  ordinary practicaI interests t o  explore 
its own possibilities. As a result i t  contributed to  an invaIuable 
critical ~Iarification of ethical and religious ideas, one of the 
supreme achievements of all time. Clarification of knowledge 
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was regarded as purification of the  spirit, making possible the  
direction of life by a true vision of t h e  good. But the  Greeks 
were unable to derive detailed techniques for practical 
achievement. They did not develop experimental methods 
beyond a rudimentary point, partly because they lacked a 
flexible algebra, partly because, though they wished t o  save 
the  phenomena, they underestimated the difficulty of de- 
termining which phenomena were worth saving, and also 
partly because they most desired the enIightenment of an 
intelligible world view. T h e  minor details were less important 
than the  major features of the  cosmos. A purpose enlightened 
by true vision could be trusted to  find detailed expression in 
practice. 
T h e  circumstances of the  second incarnation of the  scien- 
tific spirit were profoundly different. T h e  reflective, rational 
clarification of ethical and religious ideas had been carried 
far enough for the  main principles t o  be talien as established. 
There remained the  practical task of translating Christian 
charity into concrete service in t hh  world. The  study of na- 
ture, fascinating in itself, was also valued for its promise of 
aid in this great task. 
T o  bend nature t o  our purpose so as t o  improve the natural 
condition of mankind, we must, as Bacon said, obey her; we 
must learn her ways and take advantage of them. Observa- 
tion acquired a new importance, particularly the  contrived 
and measured observation of experiment. Attention was 
turned t o  the detailed processes of isolated systems, and t o  
the  mathematical determination of the  simple case, as a 
necessary condition of solving larger problems. A. D. Ritchie 
has commented on the arduousness of this procedure. "After 
all," he remarks, "men have no natural instinct for experi- 
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ments of the kind that are needed in science. They are diffi- 
cult, tedious and often disappointing operations. A very 
strong motive is needed to  make men do them." (Civilization, 
Science and Religion, p. 45) The early moderns not only had 
a number of strong motives but enjoyed, as compared with 
the Greeks, a number of marked advantages. They felt the 
same curiosity and wonder and the same zest for life; in 
addition, they were turning away from a stereotyped set of 
ideas to  an exciting exploration of new possibilities, fraught 
with untold promise of novel benefits. They were equipped 
for the task by the best of Greek science, by a superior alge- 
bra, by a taste for novelty sharpened by geographical ex- 
ploration, and by a new respect for the practicaI techniques 
and mechanical knowledge, painfully learned by countless 
generations of inarticulate craftsmen and nameless inventors. 
Wonder and the passion for constructive betterment of the 
human lot had the equipment with which to  begin. How 
pointless was rational speculation when there was work to be 
done, finding out what the world is in detail and remaking it  
nearer to  the heart's desire. KnowIedge, Bacon proclaimed, is 
power. 
Bacon's genius had correctly assessed the relation between 
knowledge of fact and productive arts. From the first there 
has been an exchange of services. Mechanical invention pre- 
ceded mechanical science. Clocks, for example, were fairly 
common in church steeples by the middle of the fourteenth 
century; large scale applications of many basic types of ma- 
chines are known to have been common in mines before the 
middIe of the sixteenth century. Pumps were in use long be- 
fore studies of the weight of air were undertaken, or the 
action of the heart understood. The investigation of terres- 
trial magnetism followed the employment of the magnetic 
compass in navigation. Galileo himself tried to  find a theo- 
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retical method of determining the strength of beams, a project 
of obvious interest t o  architect and engineer. On the other 
hand, practice obtained new guidance from theory. Galileo's 
purely scientific investigation of falling bodies furnished the 
solution of a fundamental ballistical problem, which the in- 
vention of cannon had rendered important. Sanctorius put 
the isochronism of the  pendulum to  clinical use in the pul- 
simeter. Astronomy and navigation both benefited by the 
application of the  same principle t o  clockmaking. Inci- 
dentally, no other single practical difficulty supplied as much 
impetus and direction t o  research as the  problem of ocean 
navigation. What has been called "the world's first labora- 
tory of applied science" (Ritchie, op. cit., p. r ro) was estab- 
lished, more than fifty years before the voyage of Columbus, 
by Prince Henry the  Navigator t o  improve seamanship and 
navigation. Greenwich Observatory was established by 
Charles I1 "for the  use of his seamen."(A. Wolf, A Nirtory of 
Science, Teclznology and Plzilosophy in the Sixteenth and Seven- 
teenth Centurier, p. 178. T o  Wolf is due my appreciation of 
technology's early independence of science [cf. pp. 450-452] 
as well as a number of the  facts mentioned above.) 
Scientists owed t o  practical men more than the intellectual 
stimulation of problems and the satisfaction of helping with 
the work of the world. They owed also the indispensable 
practical means of experiment, the fine instruments which 
skilled craftsmanship makes possibIe: telescopes, microme- 
ters, air pumps, and a thousand others. And they have repaid 
their debt-how generously our industrial society attests. 
From this active alliance of science and skill we have re- 
ceived the joyous gift of liberation from superstition due t o  
ignorance of causes. This, however, was not an isolated phe- 
nomenon but part of a larger movement of liberation, which 
penetrated every corner of life. Religious superstition was 
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also subjected to  a religious criticism by the Reformation and 
Protestantism. Authoritative ideas were submitted to  the test 
of personal experience in religious life. Science, it is true, had 
to  win its own bitter struggle with both Protestant and 
Catholic bigotry. It deserved to  win, being armed with in- 
finitely better methods of investigating facts and possibly 
with greater purity of motive than its antagonists. It does 
not follow, however, that i t  did win simply on merit, as if the 
whole issue lay between benighted religious conservatism and 
iconoclastic scientific progressiveness. It implies no deroga- 
tion of the merits of science in the conflict or of its contribu- 
tion t o  the victory to  suggest that i t  did not fight alone. 
Galilee's humiliation, though the most famous, was neither 
the first nor the last penalty exacted of men for their science. 
Nevertheless, more than a dispute about matters of fact was 
at stake-nothing less than an order of ideas and purposes, a 
way of life, a particular constellation of social and political 
powers and institutions. The steps by which science won and 
consolidated its freedom accompanied the gradual advance 
of a new evaluation of life. The theoretical turning points in 
the cosmological struggle were the Copernican and Darwinian 
hypotheses. But i t  may be doubted that successful resistance 
to  the power of entrenched institutions would have been 
possible without the cooperation of what we are likely to  con- 
sider all the major architectural forces in the making of the 
modern world. Scientific freedom was achieved along with 
freedom of conscience, freedom of discussion and speech, po- 
litical liberty, and perhaps even free enterprise in business. 
The respective contributions of the allies in the struggle 
have been variously assessed. A.D. Lindsay, for example, has 
suggested that "what Western civilization did in both re- 
ligion and science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
was a supreme act of Christian faith. . . . The beginning of the 
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modern adventure in both science and religion was the re- 
vival of the essentially Christian conception of the infinity 
of God and the consequent realization that God had given 
man an infinite task in understanding and doing His will 
and knowing His world." (Rel ig ion ,  Science a ~ z d  Society in the 
M o d e r n  P o r l d ,  p. 10) He goes on to  refer democratic prac- 
tices too to  a source in Protestantism: "The democratic state 
is a t  best only an analogy of the really democratic reIigious 
congregation. " (P. 19) His point is that  speculative diversity 
and free discussion were fruitful when disciplined, not by 
fixed creeds, maintained by personal or institutional au- 
thority, but by a unity of fellowship. On the other hand, it 
is more commonly held today that  the characteristic institu- 
tions and so-called ideologies of the present are traceable to  
economic factors and mechanical invention and the conse- 
quent new alignment of social powers. And a third view is 
that of the instrumentaIists, who see in experimental 
science itself the truly constructive historical force, which 
tends to  maintain free social and political institutions, while 
encouraging us to  work for the enjoyment in this life of the 
goods formerly postponed to  heaven. 
There are, no doubt, elements of truth in each of these 
views. Religious, economic, and scientific activities may all 
give expression to  our deep ambition to  develop our capaci- 
ties to  the full. Free institutions have correspondingly de- 
veloped: Protestant sects multiplied; church was separated 
fromstate; economic privilege was largely divorced fromtheold 
hereditary aristocracy; political power passed to  the middle 
classesindemocraticinstitutions;andecclesiasticalcontrolover 
education was weakened or destroyed. ReIigious, economic, 
political, and academic liberalisms reinforced one another. 
By this century science seemed to have won untrammeled 
liberty, except for minor skirmishes with anti-evolutionary 
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sentiment in backward areas. Did not scientists form a great 
international community enjoying utmost freedom of com- 
munication? Learned publications passed without hindrance 
through the  mails everywhere. Scientists were themselves 
welcome in every land. What matters a man's nationality if 
he is helping in the  infinite task of disclosing t ru th?  Also in 
the universities the sciences had gained prestige. Whereas in 
the  seventeenth century they had sought the protection of 
special academies and societies under royaI or princely 
patronage, they now enjoyed recognition, not only as special- 
ties, but as essential elements of a liberal education. The 
Platonic insight that  something of the spirit of pure science 
must inform any cultivated mind was thus realized in insti- 
tutional form once more. 
The  right, however, which the sciences validly claim, and 
the universities properly protect, as academic freedom, to  
seek truth and expound i t  without fear of retaliation, confers 
no special license to  create instruments of power. Abstract 
knowledge, to  be sure, is not itself power. But i t  is an in- 
creasingly indispensable means to  practical invention on be- 
half of non-scientific purposes; and the  art of converting theo- 
retical knowledge into efficacious machinery is far advanced. 
The  old alliance between theory and practice has now begun 
t o  pIague us. Doubts about practical purposes have rendered 
even theory an object of anxious scrutiny. Pure research no 
longer enjoys immunity from control by centralized au- 
thority, any more than scientists and scientific information 
can freely travel over the  world, Science won its freedom on 
the theoretical plane of cosmology; its ally in tha t  struggle, 
technology, has created a new threat, and even basic dis- 
coveries must be watched by those in power. This may be de- 
plorable. But what else can conscientious men do under their 
burden of responsibility ? 
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This is a further stage of the mutual adjustment of special- 
ties, which was remarked upon in the opening paragraphs. 
Theoretical science faces new, or a t  least newly recognized, 
responsibilities. If this seems surprising, perhaps it is because 
we have rather naively assumed that  if we attend t o  the tech- 
nical details, the  major ends will take care of themselves, the 
opposite of the Greek assumption that  an enlightened mind 
will find sufficient expression in the details of practice. I n  the 
past, the naive& has perhaps had sufficient excuse in the fact 
that  the chief beneficiaries of scientific advance, medicine and 
industry, have objects t o  which we gave our unhesitating 
approval. One has reduced the  natural evils of pain, disease, 
and premature death. The  other has reduced poverty and in- 
creased the leisure which is necessary for liberal pursuits. The  
simple trust that  these things will take care of themselves is 
no longer possible. The  recent demonstration that  an in- 
strument, scientific or technological, may serve quite dif- 
ferent purposes has been too thorough t o  be misunderstood. 
Pure science is confronted now with a threat from this 
quarter. It will need more extensive armament than its 
methods of demonstrating matters of fact. It wiII require 
moral greatness and courage in resisting the temptation to  
pursue the expedient, if it is to  continue as an autonomous 
discipline of the spirit, one of the glories of reason, rather 
than an adjunct t o  the arts of war and politics (including 
industry). Did not Archimedes, absorbed in the study of his 
problem, tell the  Roman soldier not to  disturb his circles in 
the sand? The  soldier killed him. He  cared neither for the  
problem nor the  man. And science died with him for nearly 
two thousand years. 
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